Abstract: This paper considers how monetary policy, a Federal funds rate shock, affects the dynamics of the US housing sector and whether the financial market liberalization of the early 1980's influenced those dynamics. The analysis uses impulse response functions obtained from a large-scale Bayesian Vector Autoregression (LBVAR) model over the periods 1968:01 to 1982:12 and 1989:01 to 2003:12, including 21 housing-sector variables at the national and four census regions. Overall, the 100 basis point Federal funds rate shock produces larger effects on the real house prices, both at the regional level and the national level, in the post-liberalization period when compared to the pre-liberalization era. While the precision of the estimates do not imply significant differences, the finding does offer a caution. That is, the housing market appears more sensitive to monetary policy shocks in the post-liberalization period. On the one hand, this suggests that monetary policy possesses increased leverage. On the other hand, the housing market cycle traditionally contributes an important component to the aggregate business cycle. Thus, the monetary authorities may need to exercise more care in implementing Federal funds rate adjustments going forward. In addition, contractionary monetary policy exerts a negative effect on house prices at the national level, indicating the absence of the price puzzle in small structural vector autoregressive models. The puzzle's absence in the housing sector possibly emerges as a result of proper identification of monetary policy shocks within a data-rich environment. Finally, we find that the reaction of housing sector proves heterogeneous across regions, with the housing sector in the South driving the national data after liberalization, while before liberalization, the Middle West appears to drive the housing market. The responses in the West differ the most from the other regions.
1.

Introduction
A number of papers (e.g., Green 1997 , Iacoviello 2005 , Case et al. 2005 , Rapach and Strauss (2006 , Leamer 2007, Pariès and Notarpietro (2008) , Vargas-Silva 2008a , Bao et al. (2009 , Christensen et al. (2009) , Ghent 2009 , Ghent and Owyang 2009 , Pavlidis et al. (2009 and Neri forthcoming) show a strong link between the housing market and economic activity in the US. Stock and Watson (2003) argue that house-price movements lead real activity, inflation, or both, and, hence, can indicate where the economy will head. Moreover, the recent emergence of boom-bust cycles in house prices cause much concern and interest amongst policy markers (Borio et al. 1994; Gertler, 1995, 1999) , since the bust of house price bubbles always lead to significant contractions in the real economy, vouched for by the current economic downturn. Given this, the thorough analysis of the effects of monetary policy on asset prices in general, and real estate prices in particular, will, in turn, lead to better understanding of the effects of monetary policy on the larger economy. This paper considers how monetary policy, a Federal funds rate (FFR) shock, affects the dynamics of the US housing sector and whether the financial market liberalization of the early 1980's influenced those dynamics. Stock and Watson (2004) , Strauss (2007, 2008) , Vargas-Silva (2008b) and Das et al. (forthcoming a,b, 2009) report evidence that numerous economic variables, such as, income, interest rates, construction costs, labor market variables, stock prices, industrial production, and consumer confidence index potentially predict movements in house prices and the housing sector. Thus, we implement our examination using a large scale Bayesian vector autoregressive (LBVAR) model that incorporates 143 monthly macroeconomic variables over the periods 1968:01 to 1982:12 and 1989:01 to 2003:12, including 21 housing-sector variables at the national and four census regions. The analysis uses impulse response functions obtained from the LBVAR model. We examine the model over these two periods to determine the effect of liberalizing the US financial markets on the sensitivity of house prices to interest rate changes.
The data set contains 21 variables relating to the housing sector, namely, housing starts, total new private housing units, mobile home shipments, home sales and home prices at the national level and housing starts, housing permits, home sales, and home prices at the four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) of the US. As such, the dynamic analysis considers not only how monetary policy affects the housing sector at the national level but also in four sub-regions.
We choose 1982 to end the first period in accordance with evidence that financial market liberalization started in the US circa 1982 (Iacoviello and Neri forthcoming; Campbell and Hercowitz 2005; and Dynan, lmendorf, and Sichel 2006) . 1 We choose to start the second period in 1989. We end the second period at the end point of the sample in the Stock and Watson (2005) dataset that we use for our estimation. In this way, we define two periods of equal length -the period from 1968 to 1982, which measures the US market prior to financial market liberalization, 1 Iacoviello and Neri (forthcoming) argue that financial liberalization started with the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, which deregulated the savings and loan industry, while Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) note that "The market innovations that followed the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 relaxed collateral constraints on household debt." (p. 1). Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) suggest that from the late 1970's to the early 2000's, businesses experienced far more extensive direct access to the financial markets. Financially weaker firms that in the past could not raise funds could now do so via "the development of an active market for high-risk debt (sometimes known as 'junk bonds')." (p. 127). "New issuance of junk bonds was essentially nil in the mid-1970s but accounted for more than 25% of total non-financial bond issuance by 1984 and 42% in 2004 . In addition, the share of capital expenditures undertaken by junk-rated firms climbed from a presumably low value in the mid-1970s to 5% in 1984 and 17% in 2004." (p. 127) . These market changes in conjunction with changes in government policies (like the abolition of interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts in the early 1980's) greatly increased the funds available for lending. At the same time that 'easy money' became available, households and businesses increased their propensity to borrow. Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) show that "The ratio of household debt to disposable personal income (DPI) rose from 0.57 in 1960 to 0.64 in 1984 and 1.14 in 2004; personal bankruptcy filings per 100,000 people climbed from 68 in 1960 to 120 in 1984 and 531 in 2004". (p. 128) .
and the period from 1989 to 2003, which measures the market after liberalization. The intervening period not in our two samples provides an adjustment period.
Similar to the LBVAR, the FAVAR approach proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) can also handle large amounts of data. The FAVAR approach extracts a few latent common factors from a large matrix of many economic variables, with the latent factors maintaining the same information content of the original data set without confronting degrees of freedom problems.
Our preference of the LBVAR over the FAVAR reflects the different requirements that these models exhibit with regard to the use of stationary and non-stationary data. The FAVAR approach requires stationary data so that the required data transformations create first-differences or growth rate versions of the variables under consideration. The LBVAR methodology, based on the appropriate design of the priors, handles non-stationary data without making data transformations, and, in the process, retains the variables in their original form. Moreover, as recently shown by Banbura et al. (forthcoming) , based on the Stock-Watson data set, the LBVAR model proves better suited to forecast key macroeconomic variables. Hence, the LBVAR becomes the preferred model. Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2004 corroborate this view, when they note that forecasting provides the root of inference and prediction in time-series analysis.
Further, argue that in time-series models, estimation and inference essentially means minimizing of the one-step (or multi-step) forecast errors, Therefore, establishing a model's superiority boils down to showing that it produces smaller forecast errors than its competitors.
We use both regional and national housing sector data since the effect of monetary policy on the economy differs according to regions and since economic conditions prevailing during a monetary policy shock do not necessarily correlate perfectly across regions (Carlino and DeFina 1998 , and Vargas-Silva 2008b Our econometric analysis focuses on impulse response functions given a 100-basis point increase in the FFR. We find that across the four regions and the aggregate US economy, monetary policy changes exert a larger effect on real house prices in the post-liberalization period when compared to eh pre-liberalization period. While the precision of the estimates do not imply significant differences, the finding does offer a caution. That is, the housing market appears more sensitive to monetary policy shocks in the post-liberalization period. On the one hand, this suggests that monetary policy possesses increased leverage. On the other hand, the housing market cycle traditionally contributes an important component to the aggregate business cycle. Thus, the monetary authorities may need to exercise more care in implementing FFR adjustments going forward. At the regional level, we conclude that prior to liberalization, the housing sector in the Middle West provides the underlying force that drives the national data, while after 1989 the housing sector in the South drives the national data. That is, the impulse responses in the South more closely match those of the national housing sector than the other regions after 1989. The West appears to differ the most from the other regions in both periods.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 outlines the theory behind the LBVAR model. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 identifies our apriori expectations and reports the results of impulse response functions, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
Basics of the LBVAR 6
Let , a vector of random variables. We define a VAR(p) model of these time series as follows:
where equals an n-dimensional vector of constants,
autoregressive matrices, and equals an n-dimensional white noise process with covariance matrix . Litterman (1986) proposes the Minnesota prior, where the researcher assumes that all equations approximate the random walk with drift. Formally,
This essentially implies shrinking the diagonal and off-diagonal coefficients of toward one and zero, respectively, as well as all coefficients of ( ) toward zero. Further, the Minnesota prior also assumes that the own lags better explain the variability of a given variable 1 A than the lags of the other variables and that the more recent lags provide more useful information than more distant lags.
The prior imposes the following moments for the prior distribution of the coefficients:
We assume that 1 ,..., p A A are independent and normally distributed coefficients. We also assume that the covariance matrix of the residuals is diagonal, fixed, and known. Formally, Ψ = ∑ , To analyze the impulse responses of the housing market variables following a monetary policy shock, one must incorporate possible correlation among the residual of the different variables. Hence, we must address Litterman's (1986) assumption of fixed and diagonal covariance matrix. Following Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) and Sims and Zha (1998) , we impose a normal prior distribution on the coefficients and an inverted Wishart prior distribution on the covariance matrix of the residuals, alternatively called the inverse-Wishart prior. Imposing these conditions requires that 1 = ϑ , which we assume.
Due to the common practice of specifying a VAR in first differences, Doan et al. (1984) propose another modification of the Minnesota prior by incorporating the sums of coefficients prior. Consider the VAR in equation (1) in its error-correction form as follows:
( )
The sums-of-coefficients prior impose the restrictions that ( ) . Asτ goes to zero, the VAR model increasingly satisfies the prior, while as τ goes to ∞ , the prior exerts no influence on the VAR estimates. Now, rewrite the VAR in equation (1) in matrix notation as follows:
where ,
, and 
, ,
We add the following dummy observations to match the Minnesota moments: 
where K = 1, ..., p, , and
ε is very small. Generally, the first block of dummies imposes prior beliefs on the autoregressive coefficients, the second block of dummies enforces the sums of coefficients priors, and the third and fourth blocks apply the priors for the covariance matrix and the uninformative prior for the intercept, respectively. Following Litterman (1986) and Sims and Zha (1998) (forthcoming) argue that the overall tightness governed by λ should reflect the size of the system --as the number of variables increases, the parameters should shrink to avoid overfitting.
To select the values for λ and τ , we use the following algorithm: (i) Select n* (n* < n)
variables as benchmarks to evaluate the in-sample fit, where in our case, as in Banbura et al.
(forthcoming), we chose three variables --employment, the consumer price index, and the FFR;
(ii) Evaluate the in-sample fit with these n* variables of the OLS-estimated VAR model; (iii) Set τ proportional to λ as 
After augmenting the regression model (5) with the dummies in (7), we obtain the following:
, and
To insure the existence of the prior expectation of , we add the diffuse prior Ψ ( )
. Once done, the posterior exhibits the following form: Given the dummy observations in (7), the posterior parameter estimates will tend toward the OLS estimates from the system defined in (5), since the Minnesota and sums-of-coefficients dummies tend to zero as and tend toward infinity. In other words, the posterior expectation of the parameters coincides with the OLS estimates of the system defined in equation (10).
λ τ
Data
We use the data set of Stock and Watson (2005) , which includes 132 monthly macroeconomic indicators covering income, industrial production, measure of capacity, employment and unemployment, prices relating to both consumer and producer goods and services, wages, inventories and orders, stock prices, interest rates for different maturities, exchange rates, money aggregates, consumer confidence, and so on. In the housing sector, this data set includes ten In addition, for non-stationary variables, we set δi = 1, while for stationary variables, we use δi = 0, implying random walk and white noise priors, respectively. 
A Priori Expectations
The deregulation of the US savings and loan industry, the development of higher-risk debt, and certain government policies enabled financially weaker firms and individuals to raise funds that they could not raise prior to these changes. We, therefore, expect to see an increase in the sensitivity of house prices to a given shock in the FFR during the post-liberalization period. Furthermore, we expect the housing markets in the West and the South to drive the national housing data. These Sun-Belt states experienced relatively rapid migration and population growth over our sample period. In addition, the West's popularity and favorable climate led to high house prices in comparison with prices in other parts of the country, suggesting that changes in house prices in the West should disproportionally influence the index of US house prices. We do not expect massive building in large parts of the Snow-Belt states in the Mid-West and the East to drive the index of US house prices. In addition, the South also experiences significant building activity. To see if the Sun-Belt states in the West and South drive the US housing market and if house prices respond more quickly after financial liberalization, we turn to our impulse response function analysis.
Impulse Response Function Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effects of a monetary policy (FFR) shock on the 21 housing- Let e C , where the monetary policy shock appears in the row of that corresponds to the position of . Given this, we can write the structural VAR as follows:
where , , and ,
In our impulse response analysis, we increase contemporaneously the FFR by one hundred basis points. Following Canova (1991) and Gordon and Leeper (1994) , we can easily compute the impulse response functions, given just identification, by generating draws from the posterior of We can compute B and C and then , 1 ( ,........ , ). exceeding that in the West (HPW) and the Middle West (HPMW).
Conclusions
This paper assesses the effects of monetary policy on US house price indexes, national and regional, using impulse response functions obtained from a LBVAR model that incorporates 143 monthly macroeconomic variables over the periods 1968:01 to 1982:12 and 1989:01 to 2003:12. The housing variables include 21 series relating to housing starts, total new private housing units, mobile-home shipments, home sales, and home prices at the national level and housing starts, housing permits, home sales, and home prices in the four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) of the US.
Our econometric analysis focuses on impulse response functions, given a 100-basis-point increase in the FFR. We compare the responses over two sub-samples to investigate the effect that financial market liberalization exerted on the sensitivity of house prices to changes in the interest rate. Overall, the 100 basis point FFR shock produces larger effects on the real house prices, both at the regional level and the national level, in the post-liberalization period when compared to the pre-liberalization era. While the precision of the estimates do not imply significant differences, the finding does offer a caution. That is, the housing market appears more sensitive to monetary policy shocks in the post-liberalization period. On the one hand, this suggests that monetary policy possesses increased leverage. On the other hand, the housing market cycle traditionally contributes an important component to the aggregate business cycle.
Thus, the monetary authorities may need to exercise more care in implementing Federal funds rate adjustments going forward. In addition, contractionary monetary policy exerts a negative effect on house prices at the national level, indicating the absence of the price puzzle in small structural vector autoregressive models. The puzzle's absence in the housing sector possibly emerges as a result of proper identification of monetary policy shocks within a data-rich environment.
At the national level, the negative effect of the monetary policy shock on house prices persists and remains significant for more than two years before liberalization, while after liberalization, prices recover rapidly in about one year. 
